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COLORADO BENEFITS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (B): 
THE EMPEROR’S NEW SYSTEM   
 
Cynthia V. Fukami 
Donald J.  McCubbrey 
Daniels College of Business 
University of Denver 
cfukami@du.edu 
ABSTRACT 
This case is a follow up to “Colorado Benefits Management System: Decision Time” (McCubbrey 
and Fukami, 2005).  It chronicles the events in the two years that followed the ill-advised 
conversion of the Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS).  CBMS was converted over 
the objections of the user community and after the expenditure of approximately $100 million.  
The results were both predictable and avoidable.  The system was fraught with errors, and the 
fallback plan was never implemented.  Clients, principally the poor and elderly, suffered as a 
result of the system’s errors and poor performance. An audit conducted by the State of Colorado 
found that millions of dollars had been misspent after conversion.  As of August 2006, CBMS 
remains a troubled system and has received a considerable amount of unfavorable publicity in 
the local and national media.  Colorado counties are struggling to use the system and worker 
morale is suffering.  A lawsuit against the State is pending.  The case concludes by asking:  Who 
is to blame for this mess?  Why is it taking so long to fix?  What could have been done differently 
to avoid the resulting chaos?  What should be done to repair CBMS?  How can progress be 
measured? 
Keywords:   consultants, conversion, implementation, legacy systems, IT project management, 
runaway projects, user acceptance testing 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Roxanne Martinez resides in Arapahoe County Colorado with her two children, ages four and 
one.  Ms. Martinez received Medicaid benefits until April 2005, when she was terminated.  
However, her two children continue to receive Medicaid.  Ms. Martinez’s Medicaid application was 
filed in June 2004; however the system only recognizes her eligibility as commencing on July 1, 
2004.  As a result, Ms. Martinez has been contacted by a collection agency requesting payment 
for medical assistance she received in June 2004.  Even though the state recently reauthorized 
Medicaid to commence on June 1, 2004 and issued her a notice stating her eligibility commenced 
on June 1, 2004, Medicaid has refused to pay for medical care she received in that month since 
she does not appear as eligible in the system.  Between February 2, 2005 and November 18, 
2005, Ms. Martinez received approximately 71 notices generated by the state concerning her 
family’s Medicaid benefits.  These notices were untimely, and/or duplicative, and/or confusing, 
often containing conflicting information regarding eligibility, often without effective dates. 
Russell McKinney lives with his family in Jefferson County Colorado.  His household receives 
Food Stamps and his children receive Medicaid assistance.  Mr. McKinney has been a Food 
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Stamp recipient for approximately four years.  He has experienced delays in the recertification 
process since September 2004.  Most recently, in March 2006, Mr. McKinney attempted to do his 
six month Food Stamp recertification, but the recertification was delayed despite Mr. McKinney’s 
prompt delivery of all requested paperwork in a timely manner.  Mr. McKinney also contacted the 
state emergency processing unit and was advised to continue to work with the county.  Mr. 
McKinney suffered a suspension of benefits in April and May 2006.  During this period Mr. 
McKinney had to utilize his meager income to pay for food rather than pay his other bills which 
are now overdue and affecting his credit status and continued employment. 
Marilyn Shaffer resides in El Paso County Colorado; because of several disabilities, she receives 
Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income.  From May 24, 2005 to January 17, 
2006, Ms. Shaffer received approximately 143 notices from the State concerning her Food Stamp 
and Adult Financial Assistance benefits. These notices were confusing, often untimely, often 
contained conflicting information, and were otherwise legally inadequate.  Further, Ms. Shaffer 
has been verbally advised by agents that she was overpaid Food Stamps and Adult Financial 
Assistance, despite receiving written notice from the State that she was entitled to receive these 
payments.  Ms. Shaffer was told that her Food Stamp benefits would be intercepted to recover on 
the alleged overpayment.  Ms. Shaffer does not have sufficient funds to support herself should 
the State undertake this collection to intercept her tax refunds and/or credits [Fourth Amended 
and Supplemental Class Action Complaint, District Court, City and County of Denver, Colorado, 
Case No. 04-CV-7059]. 
The Colorado Benefits Management System (CBMS), a purportedly unified computerized 
information technology system that collects data, determines eligibility, issues benefits, and 
provides reports for virtually all public benefit programs in Colorado went live on September 1, 
2004.  The purpose of CBMS was to replace six aging legacy systems supporting various State-
administered welfare programs with a single system using current technologies.  The expected 
benefits from CBMS were better service to clients and assurance that the State’s welfare 
programs were being administered properly.  
Despite protests from the user community that CBMS was not yet ready to be put in operation, 
the systems were converted anyway.  The results were both predictable and avoidable.  The new 
system was not capable of processing transactions as efficiently as the systems it replaced.  
Huge backlogs of unprocessed transactions developed, which resulted in employees working 
overtime, the hiring of temporary employees, and the installation of additional computer servers to 
add capacity.  Despite these efforts, county welfare offices experienced long lines of applicants, 
and many applicants had to literally wait for weeks for their applications to be approved by the 
new system and benefits to be received.  By contrast, the old systems approved new applications 
within hours.  Hundreds of people complained that they were denied benefits unfairly, their 
applications weren’t processed, or that they received contradictory letters about their eligibility.  In 
addition, some individuals received benefits to which they were not entitled.   
As of August 2006, almost two years after conversion, and after the expenditure of approximately 
$120 million, the system remains seriously flawed.  The failure of CBMS is particularly compelling 
because of the innocent people who were hurt, the cost involved, and the fact that the system 
was converted despite written user objections by professionals who should have known better.  
Who is to blame for this mess?  Why is it taking so long to fix?  What could have been done 
differently to avoid the resulting chaos? 
II. SYNOPSIS OF THE CBMS PROJECT:  1999-2004 
CBMS was undertaken in 1999 to replace six aging legacy systems supporting the various 
welfare programs in Colorado that were reaching the stage where they needed to be replaced.  
As discussed in the (A) Case [McCubbrey and Fukami, 2005], the development project was a 
classic example of a “runaway project.”  CBMS was troubled from the start.  For example: 
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• A fixed price contract for $220 million was signed with EDS because of budget 
constraints even though initial bids for the system’s development and operation (for 
ten years) from EDS and IBM came in at well over $300 million.  The contract with 
EDS was signed in July 2000, before the initial CBMS requirements baseline was 
established. 
• The technical understanding of the State’s requirements versus the vendor’s 
proposed solution was misaligned.  EDS proposed that code from a similar project it 
had used in the State of Arkansas be modified and used for CBMS.  In November 
2001, EDS concluded that the Arkansas code would not work for Colorado and used 
code from CalWin, a similar system they were developing for the State of California. 
• One appealing component of the EDS proposal was a “time of touch” conversion, 
wherein the new system would allow client data to be converted the first time it was 
accessed by a knowledge worker.  Twenty-one months were expended in the effort 
to use time of touch, the “innovative and proven methodology to convert data into 
CBMS” before it was abandoned in April 2002. 
• Another appealing element of the EDS approach was a phased roll-out of the 
system, making CBMS available to users in the counties in phases, rather than all at 
one time, thereby reducing the conversion risk.  EDS informed the State in April 2004 
that a phased conversion would not work.   
• An Independent Verification and Validation firm was engaged to provide additional 
project monitoring.  The firm, Maximus, provided weekly written reports on the 
project’s status from November 2000 until January 2004, when its contract term 
expired and was not extended for “lack of funds”.   In its final report the firm stated, 
“Unfortunately, the CBMS environment was not generally conducive to accepting or 
responding to the IV&V findings in a timely manner, resulting in greater impact to 
project progress than should have occurred”.   In addition, the final report stated that: 
 
? “Decision Tables (DT), a State responsibility to develop, continue to be 
difficult for the State to manage with any predictability, continuing to 
cause delays in the completion of initial development of the complete 
suite of CBMS DTs, a high volume of defects being encountered once 
the DTs are transitioned to User Acceptance Testing (UAT) causing 
delays in correcting defects and completing UAT, and creating significant 
doubt as to the State’s ability to manage DTs during Pilot and production. 
? The State continues to have a number of key tasks that have not been 
planned in detail or assessed against other key project activities and 
milestones making it difficult to effectively or accurately track, report, or 
predict project progress. 
? County readiness for Pilot or rollout is not clear.  Although discussions of 
readiness occur between the CBMS Project Management Office and the 
counties during meetings, structured and systematic progress reporting 
by the counties continues to be extremely weak. 
? UAT continues to slip, with increased planning of concurrent events that 
increases the risk of project failure” [Maximus, 2004].   
 
• An adequate State organizational structure (processes, procedures, resources, 
organizational structure, interfaces, etc.) to manage the CBMS was never 
established. 
III. CBMS CONVERSION:  THE FIRST YEAR 
On August 13, 2004, Marva Livingston-Hammons, Executive Director of the Colorado Department 
of Human Services and Karen Reinertson, Executive Director of the Colorado Department of 
Health Care Policy and Financing (HCPF), received a letter from the directors of human services 
in four Colorado counties.  Ms. Livingston-Hammons and Ms. Reinertson were the two senior 
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State officials charged with oversight of CBMS, which was scheduled to be converted on 
September 1, 2004 after having been postponed several times.  The letter expressed concerns 
with a number of aspects of CBMS and concluded by stating that the county directors believed 
that “…the implementation of CBMS on September 1, 2004, is unacceptable.”  [McCubbrey and 
Fukami, 2005]. 
On August 17, Karen and Marva responded in writing to the August 13 letter from the counties.  
They argued that asking the Joint Budget Committee of the Colorado Legislature (JBC) for more 
money was unacceptable, and that the only options for CBMS were to convert on September 1, 
or to kill the project.  Based on Marva’s and Karen’s recommendation, Colorado Governor Bill 
Owens issued an Executive Order directing that the transition to the new system take place on 
September 1 and that appropriate “backup systems and contingency plans” be employed “to 
ensure that eligible applicants will not be denied benefits during the transition to CBMS” and “to 
protect the benefits of clients who maintain eligibility during the transition to CBMS” [Executive 
Order D01004, State of Colorado, 2005].   
Negative publicity began almost at once. Ed Kahn and Michael Cook, private attorneys, both 
working pro bono and with the help of the Colorado Center on Law and Policy, filed suit in Denver 
District Court on behalf of CBMS beneficiaries.  The suit is based on two issues.  First, citizens 
are being denied benefits to which they are entitled by law.  Second, citizens should expect to be 
served by a system that performs at least as well as the systems that CBMS replaced. 
Things went downhill immediately after conversion.  For example, on September 30, 2004, the 
headline in a Rocky Mountain News story was “Pressure to go online,” with a lead paragraph 
which stated: 
“The state’s troubled benefits-management system went online last month—against 
several experts’ advice—because it was eating through $2 million monthly in 
development costs and money was running out, records show.  In addition, delaying 
startup would have been hard to explain to the public, a member of the project’s 
oversight committee said Thursday” [Scanlon, 2004]. 
In December 2004, Denver District Judge John Coughlin ordered the State to establish an 
emergency call center for benefits applicants and to meet a tight schedule for processing 30,000 
applications that missed federal deadlines for completion. 
In March, 2005, Deloitte Consulting was hired, for $365,000, to do a post-implementation review 
of CBMS.  Interestingly, they were specifically told not to look backward and “second guess.”  
Instead, they were asked to look forward and focus on how to fix CBMS.  This is not the 
traditional purpose of post-implementation reviews, which are typically designed to identify 
lessons learned to avoid similar disasters in the future. 
In May 2005, nearly eight months after the conversion, Governor Bill Owens appointed John 
Witwer, a retired physician and former Colorado State Representative, as Director of CBMS.  
Witwer was tasked with fixing the problems with CBMS, and was allocated $6.5 million, and given 
two years, to support the efforts [Scanlon, 2005a].  As of July, 2005, the number of help desk 
tickets (filed by county workers when they can’t process an application) remained stubbornly high 
at about 3,800, compared with a peak of about 5,200 in March, 2005 [Scanlon, 2005b].   
On the other hand, some progress has occurred.  In June, 2005, the Department of Human 
Services reported that it had resolved 97 percent of its emergency calls within 5 days, and the 
Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, which oversees Medicaid, reported that it had 
resolved 100 percent of its emergency cases within 5 days.  As of June 20, it was reported that 
92 percent of the cases had completed their conversion to CBMS, up from 67 percent in January.  
The number of applications not meeting the federal deadlines was reported to have fallen 84 
percent to 4,609 [Scanlon, 2005b]. 
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Despite the turmoil surrounding CBMS during the months following its conversion, the Colorado 
Commission on Information Management (IMC), claimed “successful deployment of CBMS” as 
one of its 2003-2004 accomplishments in its 2004 Annual Report, issued in March 2005 
[Commission on Information Management, 2005]. 
IV. STATE AUDIT FINDINGS 
The Legislative Audit Committee of the State of Colorado placed CBMS on its annual list of 
projects for 2005. The audit was conducted between January 1 and June 30, 2005.  On June 10, 
2006, the audit was released, and it gave CBMS a “passing grade, noting the state has made 
significant strides in correcting the problems that left hundreds of Colorado residents without 
access to medical treatment or food stamps nearly two years ago.”  [Rocky Mountain News, 
2006b].  
Others remained skeptical that the system was working.  On July 3, 2006, the Rocky Mountain 
News ran a story on the State auditor’s report.  The article reported that: 
“Colorado made nearly $90 million in improper welfare payments last year by overpaying 
some clients, underpaying others and being defrauded by still other stakeholders, 
according to a state audit. The improper payments amounted to: 
 • Medicaid: $48 million.  
 • Food stamps: $36 million.  
 • Temporary Aid to Needy Families: $6 million.  
The errors point to a systemic lack of oversight on more than $2.4 billion in public 
assistance payments made each year through the three programs, according to acting 
state auditor Sally Symanski”.   
“There’s no question that public dollars are at risk,” Symanski said. “It’s horrifying. We 
have a limited number of dollars to serve these people with. It’s critical that we get a 
handle on this”.  
Later in the article, Lisa Esgar, director of operations and finance for Colorado’s Health Care 
Policy and Finance Administration, which oversees Medicare and Medicaid for the State, said her 
agency’s error rate doesn’t reflect its internal monitoring and fraud oversight efforts.  “Just 
because we haven’t scientifically measured it, doesn’t mean that we’re not doing anything,” Esgar 
said.  [Smith, 2006] 
V.  THE COUNTIES’ PERSPECTIVE 
While the state argues that the reduction in help desk tickets, or recorded “defects” in the system, 
is a good metric for judging the performance of CBMS, the counties take a different perspective.  
When a county worker encounters a problem in processing an application, he or she is directed to 
the Office of CBMS, where the problem is registered.  In addition, the worker is supposed to 
provide a “screen shot” of the difficulty to the help desk.  It can take up to two hours to prepare 
and submit the required documentation.   
In addition to the difficulty of submitting a help desk ticket, county workers argue that the 
resolution of help desk tickets is a flawed metric and is not a valid measure of system 
effectiveness for a number of reasons.  Foremost, the resolution of a help desk ticket measures 
whether the problem was recorded and whether the help desk responded in a timely fashion.  It 
does not measure the resolution of the problem.  For example, there is a list of “known problems” 
for which tickets aren’t allowed to be sent. Workers also report that it is easier to call CBMS than 
it is to send tickets.  Finally, workers may not understand the technology enough to accurately 
describe their problems to the help desk experts.  Imagine how frustrating this is for the workers 
who had clients sitting at their desks and who couldn’t get a response.   
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 18, 2006), 488-496 493 
Colorado Benefits Management System (B): The Emperor’s New System by C.V. Fukami and D.J. 
McCubbrey 
Ultimately, workers tired of completing help desk tickets, so they just stopped.  One county 
worker reported:  
“We applaud the elimination of defects in CBMS, but this needs to be balanced 
with an increase in functionality…CBMS has been like a house of cards.  We fix 
one thing, and then find a new problem.  We fix that problem, then it causes a 
new problem, and on and on.  Things have calmed down, and some things have 
been fixed, but the system is not yet operating as it should”. 
As of July 2006, there were 5,943 pages of CBMS workarounds, outlining 270 procedures.  
Online help has been eliminated.  Change requests take months, even if identified as priority 
items. The county users group remains deeply concerned about the performance of CBMS. 
There are not sufficient resources available to fix the system. 
VI. WORKER MORALE 
On April 19, 2006, the Rocky Mountain News published an editorial on the continuing problems 
with CBMS, in which it was concluded that the county workers were partially to blame for the 
problem with CBMS.  
“Isn’t the excuse that the county workers need more training beginning to wear a little 
thin?  The same cadre of county workers administered benefits before, when they had to 
deal with six antique and incompatible kinds of software, and by and large they managed 
about as well” [Rocky Mountain News, 2006a]. 
It is hardly surprising that county worker morale has suffered as a result of this fiasco.  CBMS is a 
complex system involving many screens and functions.  Committees have been formed with 
county workers to provide feedback and support for CBMS, but not all counties can afford to 
participate.  The counties are committed to CBMS, but feel like they are “spinning their wheels.”  
Yet, the current structure requires that CBMS makes decisions, not the counties.  And the system 
is not getting better.  Counties must work hard to maintain morale, and buffer workers from finger 
pointing. Training has been inadequate and largely left up to the counties.  The state created 
about 12 hours of training per worker for CBMS, yet one county estimates that each worker 
needs 160 hours of training.   
VII. ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES 
The various groups that are involved in CBMS create further complications.  There are two large 
state departments involved, the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (HCPF) and the 
Department of Human Services.  These departments have a history of adversarial relations that 
extends into CBMS.  There is the Office of CBMS, and EDS, the original contractor, is still 
involved.  There are the 64 counties.  Finally, there are the agencies of the federal government 
involved as well.  It is often unclear who is ultimately accountable for the system.  In addition, it is 
unclear whether the State employed people who understood how flawed the system was. 
This confusion was also reflected in the variety of help desks available to workers.  There was a 
State help desk, a CBMS help desk, EDS system experts, and IT professionals in the two State 
departments.   
Ironically, the counties report that CBMS has driven much improvement at their level.  The 
counties feel much more technologically savvy and adaptable as a direct benefit of CBMS. 
County officials report that John Witwer has made an honest effort to improve CBMS, and there 
has been some progress.  He listens to the county users and meets with them twice a month.  He 
has restructured the unit so that the state and CBMS help desks could work together, a system 
that remained in place for about nine months, but was then abandoned.  He is seen as a skilled 
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manager, but he doesn’t have authority over Human Services or HCPF.  He is limited in how he 
can help, and the JBC cut his funding, so he does not have the staffing level he originally 
requested.  He has provided counties with a voice and has brought awareness to the legislators.  
He supports counties “to the limit” in financial areas. 
Nonetheless, one county official felt that Witwer’s public response to the audit was “unfortunate.”  
Given Witwer’s focus on collaboration, and his avoidance of pointing fingers, the counties would 
have liked to see more support of workers expressed in public sources.  
VIII. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS 
Various stakeholders report that the system has improved drastically, yet there is still far to go. 
One county worker said, “Progress is ongoing but the tunnel is too long to see the light.”  Starting 
June 1, 2006, counties can “recover” funds given in error.  However, this is likely to lead to a sad 
state of affairs because many clients will not be able to afford to repay the State.  On the other 
hand, where legitimate support was denied, patients had to spend their own money on care, and 
should receive restitution.  Most counties are experiencing 100% increases in claims and about 
70% are wrong because the system didn’t function properly, according to one county official.   
According to one knowledgeable observer, “the State has always been closed-mouthed about the 
true facts about CBMS operations, instead putting out meaningless statistics.”  As one county 
official says, “The State’s first response to any question is that CBMS is fine.  The second 
response is ‘see the first response.’”  
The outside contractor, EDS, believes that the troubles with CBMS began when the State tried to 
cut costs by modifying the initial proposal. Nevertheless, EDS executive Dick Callahan says he's 
impressed with Colorado's response to the project's setbacks so far. "With a project of this size 
and complexity, problems have to be expected," he says. What matters is "how well you react to 
them” [Perlman, 2006]. 
 District Judge Lawrence Manzanares, presiding over the lawsuit filed on behalf of CBMS 
beneficiaries, has ordered the parties to attempt settlement mediation.  Former Boulder District 
Court Chief Judge Joe Bellipanni is the mediator.  One issue of contention between the parties is 
the appropriate performance-based measures and standards for CBMS.  The plaintiffs want 
CBMS to achieve timely and accurate processing in the “high 90s.”  It is presently unknown 
whether the State will agree to such a standard.   
The plaintiffs are demanding that a reliable reporting system be implemented to verify that CBMS 
is operating as it should.  They want periodic independent audits of CBMS operations under 
statistically rigorous methods to objectively determine what still must be corrected. They also 
want assurance that clients are receiving the benefits to which they are entitled and that the State 
will be forced to compensate people who were hurt by the failure to deliver such benefits. 
The counties have called for a rigorous system analysis.  “Spending $160-200 million should at 
least get us what we had before.” 
IX. WHAT SHOULD THE NEXT GOVERNOR DO? 
The judge’s decision in the lawsuit is still pending and may extend until the end of 2006.  Even if it 
settles before then, it will probably take some time for the State to implement any changes.  In 
November 2006, due to term limits, a new Governor will be elected in Colorado.  The various 
stakeholders do not agree on the current state of CBMS effectiveness.  Clients and workers are 
still suffering.  Federal monies may have been misspent. Who is to blame for this mess?  Why is 
it taking so long to fix?  What could have been done differently to avoid the resulting chaos?  
What should be done to repair CBMS?  How can progress be measured? 
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A teaching note for faculty listed in the ISWorld directory is available from Donald J. McCubbrey 
(dmccubbr@du.edu). 
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